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Abstract
This paper analyzes the incidence of domestic and external debt
crises for a sample of 53 emerging economies between 1980 and 2005.
Even though there is substantial time variation in the default rates
during the period, sovereign default rates for domestic debts are typi-
cally lower than those for external debts. The incidence of both types
of defaults is explained by means of the estimation of independent and
simultaneous limited-dependent variable models. The results show
that while there is considerable evidence that external defaults trig-
ger domestic defaults, evidence for the reverse link disappears when
default propensities are estimated in a simultaneous equation model.
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1 Introduction
Sovereigns may chose to raise funds domestically or abroad. In either case,
the amount that creditors will be willing to bid for the sovereign’s pledges
of future disbursements will be a function of the likelihood that each group
of creditors will eventually be repaid. While the sovereign debt literature
has discussed the issues created by the weak enforcement mechanisms that
characterize sovereign credit markets at length, 1 much less has been written
on the distinction between domestic and foreign liabilities. 2 The empirical
literature in particular has largely focused on external debts. Yet, many
governments that default on their debts do so selectively: as this paper shows,
only 12 out of 52 default episodes in emerging markets since the 1980s aﬀected
both, domestic and external debt instrument holders. The novelty of this
study is to explore the determinants of both classes of default jointly and in
a systematic way. For this I use domestic and foreign sovereign debt default
data obtained from the rating agency Standard and Poor’s. To the best of my
knowledge this paper is the first to explore the inter-relation between both
classes of defaults empirically. A sample containing 53 emerging markets for
which Standard & Poor’s sovereign credit ratings are available is used for
this purpose. The findings of the paper suggest that domestic defaults are
particularly hard to anticipate, even when indebtness statistics are readily at
hand. Moreover, I find that while there is considerable evidence that external
1See for instance Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), Bulow and Rogoﬀ (1989), Delaume (1994)
and the survey article of Eaton and Fernandez (1995).
2One important exception is the study of Drazen (1998).
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defaults trigger domestic defaults, evidence for the reverse link disappears
when default propensities are estimated in a simultaneous equation model.
One possibility that is raised is that international creditors may have greater
leverage in bringing in domestic creditors to share the costs of a default than
the other way around.
Outline. The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 discusses the sample
selection, the dataset and the evolution of the global default rates over time.
In Section 3, the determinants of defaults and the main findings based on
the independent estimation of both types of default are presented. Section
4 discusses the econometric specification of the simultaneous estimation of
the probability models and the estimation results. The conclusion outlines
directions for further research.
2 Domestic vs. External Default Rates
2.1 Identifying Defaults
Any empirical study on the determinants of debt repayments needs to start
by defining which actions characterize a default. As the exact definition of a
default will always involve some degree of arbitrariness, many studies end up
using a diﬀerent set of events. Lindert and Morton (1989), Detragiache and
Spilimbergo (2001), Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2004) and Sy (2004), for instance,
all use diﬀerent characterizations of external debt crises. The issue becomes
even more important when both, domestic and external defaults are treated
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in the same study as a consistent definition needs to be used to flag the credit
incidents. This paper follows Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2004) in that it uses
Standard and Poor’s identification of sovereign defaults, as this choice allows
for ready comparison between domestic and external credit incidents without
compromising consistency. It should be noted here that rating agencies tend
to follow rather strict standards in the sense that they typically consider
that any change on the original terms of a repayment contract constitutes
a default. 3 It is also important to note that in this sense, technically,
a surprise burst of inflation does not constitute a default on local-currency
debt instruments - even if debt instruments are not-indexed and the value of
the debt stock is eﬀectively diluted. 4
2.2 The Global Evolution of the Default Rates
The panel of this study comprises 53 emerging market countries that cur-
rently have debt instruments rated by Standard and Poor’s, where emerging
markets were defined as countries that either had a per capita GDP between
$1,000 and $10,000 or a GDP of at least $30 bn in 2005. 5 The later crite-
rion adds India, Indonesia, Nigeria, Pakistan and Ukraine to the sample. In
these countries there is arguably a critical mass of demand for government
3For the time period in which ratings are available I consider that a sovereign enters
into technical default when its sovereign rating falls below B-.
4Along these lines, Doepke and Schneider (2006) calculate that if inflation were 5%
higher than what was expected in a benchmark year for 10 consecutive years, the US
government would gain between 5 and 13% of GDP through the reduction of the real
value of its debt.
5Measured in year 2000 $ values. Lebanon was left out due to substantial gaps in the
time series.
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liabilities. All countries with a per capita GDP above $10,000 were left out as
the likelihood of default in this group is minimal. This means that countries
such as Greece, Israel, Portugal and South Korea are not part of the sample.
Only Kuwait had a higher per capita GDP when it defaulted on its domestic
debts in the year 1990. Apart from Kuwait, the richest country to experience
a default during the sample period was Argentina (with a per capita GDP
of $7,300 in 2001).
The sample selection criteria also exclude all countries that did not have
a sovereign credit rating by June 2007. Presumably, countries that have not
requested a rating are less active in private credit markets. It is certainly
possible that this selection criterion is itself a function of the default propen-
sity. However, including countries that have been largely inactive in private
markets could introduce a bias in the results, since some countries might
not reschedule their debts simply because they were not able to borrow in
the first place. The complete list of countries and the default episodes since
1980 is presented in Table 1. The sample is very broad in the sense that
countries with diﬀerent histories of credit incidents are included in the study.
The regional divide is as follows: 22 Latin American countries, 12 (Eastern)
European, 12 Asian, 6 African and Fiji. The sample period covers 18 cases of
domestic default and 43 cases of external default. 22 out of the 53 developing
countries in the sample have not defaulted on either type of obligations since
1980, whereas 18 countries have defaulted both, domestically and externally.
6
6Note that all countries in the sample have both, a local and a foreign currency debt
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[Table 1 about here]
Table 2 shows that a typical country in this sample has an annual de-
fault likelihood of 3.90% for external liabilities, which compares to 1.65% for
domestic liabilities. This implies that a representative developing country
would fail to repay its external obligations once every 25 years on average
and the obligations to its own citizens once every 60 years. The diﬀerence
in the default rates suggests that there is indeed a good reason for the ob-
servation that rating agencies typically grant a higher rating for domestic
government debt instruments than to international. As Cantor (2003, p.57)
explains, the diﬀerence [in the credit rating] is usually justified in terms of
the sovereign’s ability to tax and appropriate domestic currency assets, which
is often assumed to be greater than in the case of foreign currency assets. In
addition, while the sovereign must generate foreign exchange to repay foreign
currency debts, it can print money to meet domestic currency obligations. It
should be noted that the latter distinction is less relevant when the exchange
rate is not fixed. In such cases the ability to print money may also be in-
strumental in repaying foreign debt since a government could print money
in order to buy foreign exchange instead of using the fresh currency to buy
domestic debt instruments. Naturally, either strategy would eventually cause
inflation and the devaluation of the domestic currency.
Diﬀering risks for diﬀering debt instruments issued by the same sovereign
are not a new phenomenon. An interesting study by Waldenstrom (2005)
for instance shows that already well before World War II creditors of Scan-
rating.
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dinavian governments have requested risk premia that diﬀered considerably
according to the type of debt. Furthermore, the above statistics on the inci-
dence of defaults hide important idiosyncrasies between groups: for instance,
if we restrict our attention to only the 20 countries in the sample that are par-
liamentary democracies, an external default typically occurs every 64 years,
while a domestic default typically occurs only every 180 years. These figures
however ignore the fact that many domestic and external debt incidents oc-
curred simultaneously. As Table 2 shows, no less than 63% of all domestic
debt defaults were accompanied by defaults on external debts within a year,
while only 27% of external defaults were accompanied by domestic defaults.
[Table 2 about here]
Figure 1 shows the trend in domestic and external default rates of the
emerging markets in the sample. It is noteworthy that the domestic default
rate has increased markedly in the recent period, i.e. towards the end of the
sample period: it has increased from a rate below 0.5% per annum in the
mid-1990s to 3% between 2001 and 2005. The major default, of course, was
that of the Argentine Republic - which defaulted on its liabilities at the end
of 2001. On the other hand, the external default rate shows more dramatic
swings in the sample, as the period includes the external debt crises of the
1980s. The increase of the external default rate to 3.8% in the last five
years of the sample seems to have ended a period in which external defaults
were relatively few. The following section discusses and tests the explanatory
power of the main determinants of both types of defaults.
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[Figure 1 about here]
3 The Determinants of Defaults
Most studies so far have either ignored domestic debts or treated external and
domestic debt crises as independent events. Mainly to permit comparisons
with earlier studies, this section draws on the existing literature to analyze
the determinants of both types of defaults when debt crises are considered
as independent events. The next section then introduces a methodology
for the simultaneous estimation of both limited-dependent variable models,
highlighting the potential for interaction between crisis in both segments of
the market.
3.1 Domestic
Few studies have tried to determine the factors that drive governments to
default on its domestic liabilities empirically. 7 In order to identify the
main determinants of domestic debt crises, the explanatory power of some
economic and institutional variables mentioned in earlier theoretical studies
is tested with the panel of 53 developing countries spanning over a 26-year
period. It should be mentioned that, because of limited data availability, the
number of observations used in each estimation depends on the particular
choice of explanatory variables. This variation in the sample size is no longer
7The only such study known to this author is that of van Rijckeghem and Weder-di-
Mauro (2004) that relies on non-parametric analysis. The study however does not focus
on the joint determination of domestic and external debt defaults.
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an issue once we settle with one set of explanatory variables. Furthermore,
the lack of direct measures of indebtness for a representative set of countries
makes this study rely on proxy measures such as the M3/GDP ratio, the
accumulated budget deficits, or the growth rate of government expenditures
as potential explanatory variables. All economic explanatory variables were
obtained from the World Bank Development Indicators or the IMF Interna-
tional Financial Statistics and are lagged by one period when included as
regressors. Summary statistics are shown in Table 3.
[Table 3 about here]
The main institutional variable used as a regressor is in eﬀect a measure
of constraints on rulers in the sense of North (1981). More specifically, a
dummy variable that indicates whether the country in question has a parlia-
mentary form of government and at the same time is classified as a democracy
is used as a proxy for such checks and balances. The dummy variable takes
the value one if Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2001) classify the form
of government of the country in question as being parliamentary and the
country has a POLITY score above zero - which is typically associated with
democratic regimes. In an influential paper, North and Weingast (1989) have
argued that sovereigns that could be ejected by the legislature through a con-
fidence motion - as is the case in parliamentary regimes - are less prone to
default on their debts. This is because those groups that are likely to be
the most adversely aﬀected by discontinuations of debt servicing are typi-
cally well represented or have influence on Parliament and could eventually
9
push for a change in government. Recent studies by van Rijckeghem and
Weder-diMauro (2004), Bordo and Meissner (2006) and Kohlscheen (2007)
find that this institutional commitment mechanism is remarkably successful
in explaining external debt crises or their absence in the developing world of
both, today and earlier times. 8 As the Constitutional form of government
has typically been inherited from the colonial past and very rarely changes
in democracies - even though other components of the Constitution clearly
do change from time to time - one could argue that this institution is one
of the deep parameters that Glaeser, LaPorta, Lopes-de-Silanez and Shleifer
(2004) suggest to be the most appropriate for studies that intend to capture
the commitment role embedded in institutions.
The number of years that the current head of state has been in oﬃce has
also been included as a potential explanatory variable. If heads of government
do eventually go for a debt rescheduling strategy, they may have incentives
to default earlier on in their term in oﬃce, rather than shy away capital when
their term is ending and electoral financing may be more needed.
Table 4 shows that the only explanatory variables in the probit regres-
sions that are significant at the .05 confidence level are the parliamentary
democracy dummy and the GDP growth rate. 9 Domestic defaults are
more likely to occur during recessions and in countries that are not parlia-
mentary democracies. Moreover, if anything, they tend to occur earlier on
8It can also explain the pattern of serial defaulters alluded to by Lindert and Morton
(1989) and Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2004).
9Easterly (2001) analyzes the eﬀect of economic growth on default probabilities in great
detail.
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in the terms of heads of state, but the p-value in this case is .11. 10
A number of additional economic proxies have been tested. None of them
added substantial explanatory power. The additional regressors included the
CPI inflation rate, the variation of the inflation rate in the previous 10 years,
the M3/GDP ratio, the accumulated budget deficits, or the growth rate of
government expenditures. Table A, in the appendix, shows that none of these
variables seems to be able to explain the occurrence of domestic defaults on
a systematic basis.
One limitation of the specifications tested here is that they do not take
domestic indebtness indicators into account directly. The only reason for this
is one of data availability. Cowan, Levy-Yeyati, Panizza and Sturzenegger
have however recently put together a domestic debt database. This makes
the direct inclusion of their indebtness indicators in the vector of explanatory
variables possible. Even though their database goes beyond Latin American
economies, including the domestic indebtness statistics does reduce the sam-
ple size by more than two thirds. Table A in the appendix shows that the
domestic debt/GDP ratio does not aﬀect the likelihood of debt reschedul-
ing in a significant way, neither does the real interest rate. This may be
less surprising for readers that are already familiar with the sovereign debt
literature: the finding is not at odds with earlier findings for defaults on ex-
ternal liabilities. Indeed, Reinhart, Rogoﬀ and Savastano (2003) show that
10Note that in order to avoid double counting, countries were left out of the sample in
the two years that followed a default on either class of creditors. This methodology is
employed throughout the paper, with exception of the estimation in the second column of
Table 5.
11
the majority of countries that have defaulted on their foreign debt had in-
debtness levels that would have satisfied the Maastricht criterion at the time
of default.
[Table 4 about here]
3.2 External
In the context of external debt, it is well known that macroeconomic variables
and liquidity indicators typically carry some explanatory power as determi-
nants of credit crises. The so-called ’ratio variables’ have been widely used
to explain the incidence of defaults (see Detragiache and Spilimbergo (2001),
for instance). The right column on Table 4 shows the estimation results for
the onset of external default probit estimation. As one would expect, sov-
ereign borrowers fail to repay foreign creditors if the economy is struggling
to grow and the debt service burden is high relative to the total revenues
obtained by the country from exporting goods and services. Also, a higher
stock of international reserves relative to imports of goods and services tends
to reduce the likelihood of a default. Moreover, parliamentary democracies
tend to be more reliable debtors. 11 These results largely confirm findings
of earlier studies.
11Kohlscheen (2007) shows that this observation is robust to the exclusion of Latin
American countries (that are mostly presidential regimes) and/or OECD members (that
are almost all parliamentary democracies).
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4 Bivariate and Multi-Variate Analysis
Arguably, one of the main caveats of the analysis in the previous section is
that it ignores the relationship that may exist between domestic and external
defaults: the fact that a country has stopped servicing its domestic debt
might by itself aﬀect the probability of an external default occurring and
vice-versa. The possibility of such relations is captured by the econometric
specifications that are used in this section.
4.1 Independent Estimation
The results of the bivariate analysis shown in Table 5 suggest that the events
are indeed strongly inter-related, as suggested by Table 2 and the Covariance
matrix in Table B of the Appendix. Moreover, the second column of the table
shows that adding lagged default dummies does not improve the overall fit
of the probit regressions. The remainder of the analysis therefore relies on
contemporaneous default dummies, continuing to apply a 2 year window after
the onset of default episodes.
The multi-variate analysis, shown in the third column, adds the contem-
poraneous default indicators to the explanatory variables used in the previ-
ous section. Low growth rates and a high debt service burden continue to
be identified as the main culprits that trigger external default. As earlier,
parliamentary democracies default less often on foreigners, but this eﬀect is
now only statistically significant at the .10 confidence level. On the domestic
side, however, the economic explanatory variables lose their statistical sig-
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nificance, though they continue to obtain the expected sign. Independent
estimation does suggest that domestic default triggers external default and
vice-versa at the .01 level.
[Table 5 about here]
4.2 Simultaneous Estimation
Finally, a complete consideration will take the fact that domestic and ex-
ternal defaults are jointly determined into account during the estimation.
An indication that something is being missed when both limited-dependent-
variable models are estimated independently comes from the fact that the
residuals obtained from the domestic and the external debt default estima-
tions in the previous sections are correlated. What needs to be estimated
then, are not the individual probit regressions, but the system
y1 = α1y2 + β01X1 + u1
y2 = α2y1 + β02X2 + u2
where y1 and y2 are the binary dependent variables. As Mallar (1977) and
Maddala (1983) have shown, these simultaneous probit model leads to the
reduced form:
y1 = π11X1 + π12X2 + v1 (1)
y2 = π21X1 + π22X2 + v2 (2)
We are able to estimate
14
y∗1 =
α1σ2
σ1
y∗2 +
β01
σ1
X1 +
u1
σ1
(3)
y∗2 =
α2σ1
σ2
y∗1 +
β02
σ2
X2 +
u2
σ2
(4)
where y∗i = yi/σi and σi =
p
var(vi). Mallar’s method consists of estimating
the reduced form in (1) and (2) and then use the predicted values y∗1 and y∗2
to estimate (3) and (4). The results of such procedure are displayed in Table
6. The covariance matrices were computed wih a code that was based on
Maddala (1983).
The results of the simultaneous probit estimation show that, as before,
low growth rates, a high debt servicing burden and concentration of power
in the hands of the head of government tend to lead to more frequent breaks
of international repayment promises. The discontinuation of servicing of
international obligations, in turn, seems to trigger default at home as well.
Interestingly, the evidence of the reverse causality disappears altogether when
the equations are estimated simultaneously, suggesting that the former link
is more robust empirically.
[Table 6 about here]
5 Concluding Remarks
Defaults are driven by economic and political considerations. They are par-
ticularly likely in low growth environments, when the external debt servicing
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burden is high and when there is relatively more power vested in the exec-
utive. Typically the sovereign default rate on domestic debt instruments is
lower than that on external debts, though it is notable that the former has
increased markedly since the mid-1990s. Furthermore, we found that defaults
on external debt are more likely to lead to defaults on domestic debt than
vice-versa. This suggests that international creditors are more able to bring
domestic creditors in to share the cost of a default than domestic creditors
are. While more detailed research on the political economy of burden sharing
is warranted, one possibility is that international creditors may have more
leverage than domestic ones on international financial institutions. These can
then eﬀectively force creditors in developing countries into burden sharing.
Future research should aim at disentangling the finer political economy
aspects of each type of default, identifying which groups are more likely to
benefit or loose from such action as well as the eﬀects they may have on the
choice of government policies.
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Table 1 - Country Table
from to parliam. dem. domestic def. external def. from to parliam. dem. domestic def. external def.
Argentina 1980 2005 no 1982,1989,2001 1982,2001 Latvia 1994 2005 yes
Bulgaria 1993 2005 2002- Morocco 1980 2005 no 1983,1986
Belize 1985 2005 yes 2005 2005 Mexico 1980 2005 no 1982
Bolivia 1980 2005 no 1980,1986 Macedonia 1997 2005 yes
Brazil 1980 2005 no 1986,1990 1983 Mauritius 1982 2005 yes
Barbados 1980 1998 yes Malaysia 1980 2005 yes
Botswana 1980 2004 yes Nigeria 1980 2005 no 1982
Chile 1980 2005 no 1983 Oman 1980 2005 no
China 1983 2005 no Pakistan 1980 2005 1989-1998 1998
Colombia 1980 2005 no Panama 1980 2005 no 1983
Costa Rica 1980 2005 no 1981 Peru 1980 2005 no 1980,1983
Czech Rep. 1994 2005 yes Philippines 1980 2005 no 1983
Dominican Rep. 1980 2005 no 1981,1999,2003 1982,2003 Poland 1992 2005 no
Ecuador 1980 2005 no 1999,2005 1982,1999,2005 Paraguay 1980 2005 no 2003 1986,2003
Egypt 1980 2005 no 1984 Romania 1982 2005 1990- 1986
Estonia 1994 2005 no Russia 1995 2005 no 1998
Fiji 1980 2000 1980-86,1991- El Salvador 1980 2005 no 1981
Grenada 1980 2004 yes 2004 2004 Slovakia 1994 2005 yes
Guatemala 1980 2005 no 1986,1989 Thailand 1980 2005 yes
Croatia 1993 2005 no 1993 Trinidad & Tob. 1980 2005 yes 1988
Hungary 1984 2005 1991- Tunisia 1980 2005 no
Indonesia 1982 2005 no 1998 Turkey 1980 2005 1984- 1982
India 1980 2004 yes Ukraine 1995 2005 no 1998 1998
Jamaica 1980 2005 yes 1981,1987 Uruguay 1980 2005 no 2003 1983,1987,1990,2003
Jordan 1980 2005 no 1989 Venezuela 1980 2005 no 1995 1983,1990,1995,2002,2005
Kazakhstan 1996 2005 no South Africa 1995 2005 no
Lithuania 1994 2005 no
0%
3%
6%
9%
12%
1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005
0%
1%
2%
3%
Figure 1 - Sample Default Rate (5 yr mov. av.)
domestic
external
Table 2 - Domestic vs. External Defaults
                 External
obs Service Default
Service 1102 33 1135
Default 7 12 19
Domestic 1109 45 1154
% Service Default
Service 95.49% 2.86% 98.35%
Default 0.61% 1.04% 1.65%
96.10% 3.90% 100%
Note: All defaults within the window t-1,t or t+1 considered.
Table 3 - Summary Statistics
obs mean std. dev. min max
Domestic def. 1049 0.017 0.130 0 1
External def. 1049 0.041 0.198 0 1
Parliamentary dem. 1049 0.335 0.472 0 1
years in office 1049 6.756 8.219 1 46
GDP growth 1049 0.037 0.045 -0.261 0.178
debt service / exports 1049 0.222 0.153 0.003 1.288
intl reserves / imports 1049 0.418 0.344 0.022 2.785
short-term debt / ext debt 1049 0.167 0.116 0.000 0.817
ext debt / GDP 1049 0.495 0.281 0.026 2.313
Note: 2 year window after defaults.
Table 4 - Determinants of Defaults: Probit Estimation
D.V.: Onset of Debt Default
domestic external
parliamentary democracy -0.540 -0.413
0.269** 0.205**
years in office t-1 -0.040
0.025
GDP growth t-1 -4.421 -5.518
1.816** 1.468***
debt service / exports t-1 2.236
0.414***
intl reserves / imports t-1 -0.528
0.319*
short-term debt / ext debt t-1 0.787
0.693
Observations 1049 1049
Log likelihood -82.77 -152.08
Chi**2 16.48 54.77
Robust std errors. Constants not reported.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 5 - Determinants of Defaults 
D.V.: Onset of Domestic Debt Default
bivariate multivariate
external debt default t 1.803 1.788 1.741
0.247*** 0.244*** 0.263***
external debt default t-1 0.489
0.438
parliamentary democracy -0.545
0.343
years in office t-1 -0.046
0.028
GDP growth t-1 -2.084
2.170
Observations 1049 1154 1049
Log likelihood -66.2 -71.9 -61.7
Chi**2 49.63 49.86 58.63
D.V.: Onset of External Debt Default
bivariate multivariate
domestic debt default t 2.147 2.087 1.947
0.309*** 0.299*** 0.325***
domestic debt default t-1 0.354
0.497
parliamentary democracy -0.363
0.220*
GDP growth t-1 -4.763
1.565***
debt service / exports t-1 2.216
0.439***
intl reserves / imports t-1 -0.412
0.332
short-term debt / ext debt t-1 0.866
0.738
Observations 1049 1154 1049
Log likelihood -154.6 -165.5 -133.4
Chi**2 49.63 49.28 92.11
Robust std errors. Constants not reported.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 6 - Determinants of Defaults: Simultaneous Estimation
DV: Onset of Debt Default
domestic external
external debt default t 0.578
0.198***
domestic debt default t 0.018
0.088
parliamentary democracy -0.268 -0.406
0.237 0.218*
years in office t-1 -0.042
0.026
GDP growth t-1 -1.356 -5.427
2.068 1.807***
debt service / exports t-1 2.213
0.497***
intl reserves / imports t-1 -0.515
0.377
short-term debt / ext debt t-1 0.784
0.682
Observations 1049 1049
Log likelihood -80.0 -152.1
Chi**2 21.98 54.78
Standard errors computed as in Mallar (1977). Constants not reported
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table A - Alternative Explanatory Variables for Domestic Defaults 
D.V.: Onset of Default
parliamentary democracy -0.540 -0.515 -0.402 -0.700 -0.116 0.048 p.p. p.p.
0.269** 0.273* 0.290 0.342** 0.447 0.477
years in office t-1 -0.040 -0.036 -0.048 -0.052 -0.085 -0.101 -0.298 -0.290
0.025 0.026 0.034 0.034 0.093 0.102 0.186 0.193
GDP growth t-1 -4.421 -4.824 -6.659 -4.355 -6.803 -5.260 -5.547 -2.269
1.816** 2.087** 2.386*** 2.206** 3.529* 3.853 4.815 2.551
inflation t-1 0.407 -0.134 -2.344 -1.867
0.366 0.670 3.073 3.362
std dev (inflation_10) t-1 -0.596 -1.385
1.234 2.178
gov. expenditure growth t-1 0.580 -2.473 -2.270
1.287 2.544 2.551
domestic debt / GDP t-1 -2.844 -5.103 -6.817 -6.962
1.806 3.081* 4.172 4.154*
real interest rate t-1 0.000 -0.001 -0.001
0.013 0.016 0.017
dom.debt/GDP*real rate t-1 0.074 0.101 0.119
0.068 0.083 0.092
Observations 1049 1001 858 966 342 312 234 234
Log likelihood -82.77 -80.95 -63.71 -69.35 -33.18 -31.18 -23.74 -23.46
Chi**2 16.48 18.43 15.58 16.02 9.52 12.04 15.44 16.00
p.p.: dropped due to perfect prediction. Constants not reported
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table B - Covariance Matrix
onset_dom onset_ext parliament years GDP growth debt serv/X intl res/M ST debt/D
onset_dom 1
onset_ext 0.3848*** 1
parliament -0.063 -0.084 1
years -0.054 -0.007 -0.180 1
GDP growth -0.096 -0.137 0.029 0.099 1
debt serv/X -0.002 0.091 -0.169 0.130 -0.089 1
intl res/M -0.032 -0.027 0.001 0.040 0.114 -0.199 1
ST debt/D -0.008 0.015 0.047 -0.096 0.017 -0.135 -0.111 1
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
